INVESTMENT FUNDS WITH LEGAL PERSONALITY – A TRUE RIVAL TO MUTUAL FUNDS? by Morana Derenčinović Ruk et al.
167




INVESTMENT FUNDS WITH LEGAL 
PERSONALITY – A TRUE RIVAL 
TO MUTUAL FUNDS? *
Morana Derenčinović Ruk **
Mihaela Braut Filipović ***
Suzana Audić Vuletić ****
ABSTRACT
Investment funds come in a large variety of legal forms, investment techniques, target 
investors, redemption rights, and others. It is often said that there are no two invest-
ment funds that are the same. The focus of this article is the legal form in which they 
come. Authors shall analyze the position of investors in funds with legal personality 
in order to discuss differences in comparison to investors in mutual funds. On the EU 
level only the UCITS funds are harmonized, while alternative investment funds are 
left to national regulations. The aim is to discuss whether the legal status of invest-
ment funds is a real yardstick for determining the crucial investor’s rights such as 
redemption rights and relations between the investors and fund managers. In order 
to provide answer authors shall compare funds in jurisdictions that are comparable 
and often serve as role models, as well as those in which the fund industry is most 
developed, followed by the Croatian perspective. Finally, the authors shall contribute 
to the discussion of how can traditional types of companies such as joint-stock or 
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limited liability companies be integrated into the capital market law arena, serving 
as a vessel to investment funds.
KEYWORDS: investment funds with legal personality; Joint-stock and 
limited liability company as investment funds; investors as shareholders; re-
demption right
1. INTRODUCTION
The investment funds industry is spread throughout the EU Member States. 
Still, the current trend is that the highest number of the UCITS funds is found-
ed in Luxembourg, and the highest number of the alternative investment funds 
(further in text: AIF) is founded in Germany.1 The regulation of alternative 
investment funds is left to the Member States. Regardless of their many dif-
ferences throughout the national legislations, for the application of the Alter-
native Investment Fund Directive (further in text: AIFMD)2, the main criteria 
are whether they are open-ended or closed-ended funds. Redemption right and 
its frequency remained the decisive element for determining if the fund is 
open-ended or closed-ended. As to their advantages to investors, the open-end-
ed funds offer redemption rights while the closed-ended funds primarily offer 
a less costly investment into illiquid assets and elimination of transaction costs 
for redeeming shares borne by investors in open-ended funds. In order to make 
the funds operative, national legislators offered different legal forms and solu-
tions. The aim is to discuss whether the legal status of investment funds is a 
real yardstick for determining the crucial investor’s rights such as redemption 
rights and relations between the investors and fund managers. Authors shall 
present the legal solutions from Luxembourg and Germany who both offer 
open-ended funds in the legal form of the joint-stock company; in order to 
research whether the legal form of the fund can further influence the choice 
of the investor as well as the decision of fund managers in which legal form 
should the fund be established. Authors shall put special focus on the Croatian 
solutions, especially how can funds established as joint-stock companies be 
integrated into the capital market law arena, and if the current solutions follow 
examples from jurisdictions which often serve as role models. 
1 See Zetzsche, D. A.: The anatomy of European investment fund law, in: Birdthistle, 
W.A., Morley, J. (eds): Research Handbook on the Regulation of Mutual Funds, Chelten-
ham, 2018, p. 307. For more accurate data see ESMA Annual Statistical Report, EU Alter-
native Investment Funds, 2019, [https://www.esma.europa.eu/document/eu-alternative-invest-
ment-funds-2019-statistical-report], accessed on 03/07/2020.
2 Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC 
and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, (OJ L 174, 1/07/2011).
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2. AVAILABLE LEGAL STRUCTURES FOR SETTING UP THE 
INVESTMENT FUND IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MEMBER 
STATES
According to the AIFMD, alternative investment funds are not UCITS funds 
but are also collective investment undertakings, which raise capital from a 
number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined 
investment policy for the benefit of those investors.3 Besides these cumula-
tive criteria, the European Securities and Markets Authority (further in text: 
ESMA) argued that an additional factor in determining the AIF should also be 
that investors have no control or day-to-day discretion regarding the assets of 
the AIF.4 In that, shareholders’ voting rights in AIFs established as a company 
(primarily joint-stock company or Limited Liability Company) should not be 
considered as having control over the investment strategy of the AIF.5
The legal shape in which the AIF is constituted is not decisive. Namely, it is 
not relevant if AIF is constituted under the law of contract, under the trust 
law, statute, or has any other legal form.6 This should include legal forms as 
partnerships and foundations as well.7 The legal structure of the managers of 
the AIFs (further in text: AIFM) is also irrelevant.8 Further, the AIFMD does 
not limit AIFs based on the types of assets they choose to invest in or their 
investment strategies.9 Due to the diversity of their investment strategies, there 
3 Article 4 (1a) AIFMD. ESMA further analyses these criteria. See ESMA: Discussion 
paper: Key concepts of the Alternative investment fund Managers Directive and types of 
AIFM, ESMA/2012/117, February 2012, [https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/li-
brary/2015/11/2012-117.pdf], accessed on 11/08/2020. UCITS funds are aimed primarily at 
retail investors, and in order to protect their interest, the EU legislator extensively regulated 
the UCITS funds. All UCITS fund, regardless of their legal status, can be formed only as 
open-ended funds with public offerings. See extensively in Braut Filipović, M.: Pravni položaj 
i odgovornost depozitara UCITS fondova, Rijeka, 2015. On the other hand, AIFs are primarily 
designed for the institutional investors, and their regulation is left to national legislation of the 
Member States. On the EU level, only some aspects for managers of AIFs and depositaries 
are regulated within the AIFMD, while investment strategies and legal frameworks of AIFs 
greatly vary.
4 Ibid., p. 11.
5 See Zetzsche, D. A., Preiner, C. D.: Scope of the AIFMD, in Zetzsche, D. A. (ed.): The 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2015, p. 75. 
6 Article 2 (2b) AIFMD. 
7 See Zetzsche, D. A.: The anatomy of European investment fund law, op. cit., p. 340.  
8 Article 2(2c) AIFMD. AIFMD’s only request is that the AIFM has to be a legal person 
whose regular bussines is managing one or more AIF.
9 Asset could include for example traditional assets (equity, equity related, debt, etc.) private 
equity, real estate, and also other non-traditional asset classes such as ships, forests, wine etc., 
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are hardly two AIFs that are the same.10 Thus, how will the AIF be constituted 
or classified is left to the Member States according to their national regulations 
and the need of their economy. 
3. REDEMPTION RIGHT – A TRUE YARDSTICK FOR CHOOSING 
THE INVESTMENT FUND?
AIFs could be differentiated in several ways. For example, whether they are 
open-ended or closed-ended, internally or externally managed, whether they 
employ leverage and others. However, the most relevant distinction of the AIFs 
on the EU level for the purpose of differentiating the AIFMs and indirect-
ly AIFs they manage under the AIFMD is whether they are open-ended or 
closed-ended funds.11 These criteria were taken into account in order to ensure 
that AIFMD is adequately applied regarding the liquidity management and 
valuation procedures which differ depending on whether the AIF is open-end-
ed or closed-ended.
What is the difference between these two types of AIFs? ESMA issued an 
opinion in which it elaborated that both open-ended and closed-ended AIFs 
under the AIFMD can have redemption rights, but the difference is in the 
frequency of the redemption for the investors.12 It further argued that inves-
tors perceive a fund as open-ended if they can redeem their shares or units 
and any combination thereof. Based on the current AIF’s on the European Market ESMA, 
predicted six types of AIF’s according to asset classes: non UCITS funds that invest in asset 
classes similar to those in which UCITS invest but which do not respect UCITS diversifica-
tion or leverage requirements; Non UCITS fund that invest in financial instruments that are 
not eligible assets fot UCITS; Private equity funds; Venture capital funds; real estate funds; 
alternative investment fund  investing in the wide variety of assets including the ships, art, 
wine, patents, rights, forestry, coins, precious metals, endowment policies, carbon instruments, 
life sciences and commodities. See ESMA, Discussion paper: Key concepts of the Alternative 
investment fund Managers Directive and types of AIFM, op. cit.
10 AIFs must repost their investment strategy to the regulator. See Annex IV of Commis-
sion Delegated Regulation (EU) No 231/2013 of 19 December 2012 supplementing Direc-
tive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to exemptions, 
general operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, transparency and supervision, (OJ L 83, 
22/03/2013).
11 See ESMA, Consultation paper – Draft regulatory technical standards on types 
of AIFMs, ESMA 2012/844, 2012,  [https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/li-
brary/2015/11/2012-844.pdf], assessed on 14/10/2020.
12 ESMA, Opinion Draft regulatory tehnical standarts on types of AIFMS under Article 
4 (4) of Directive 2011/61/EU, 13 August 2013, [https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/library/2015/11/2013-1119_opinion_on_draft_rts_on_types_of_aifms.pdf], assessed on 
15/10/2020, par. 10 and par. 26.
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at least once per year.13 On the other hand, the European Commission in its 
letter to ESMA argued that redemption frequency as criteria for differentiating 
open-ended from closed-ended AIFs is not in accordance with the AIFMD.14 
It considered that the criteria should be whether they redeem the investors’ 
shares at all, irrespective of the frequency.
Final solutions were adopted in the Regulation (EU) No. 694/2014.15 The Reg-
ulation set forth the criteria for both determining the redemption right and the 
frequency of redemption right for differentiating open-ended and closed-end-
ed funds. When the redemption is taken as a yardstick for differing between 
open-ended and closed-ended AIFs, it refers to situations when the AIF re-
purchases the share from the assets of the AIF.16 For this purpose, redemption 
shall not be considered the sale of shares through the secondary market or 
otherwise. Equally, the same goes for the decrease of the share capital and sub-
sequent return of the payment to investors.17 As to the frequency of redemption 
right, in order to consider an AIF as an open-ended fund, the redemption of 
shares must be available at the request of the shareholders. This possibility 
should stay open for investors until the liquidation of the fund in accordance 
with the frequency which is set in the official documents of the fund (prospec-
tus and others). As to the time limit, Regulation (EU) No. 694/2014 only men-
tions the five year period as a yardstick, the meaning that if the investor has no 
right to redeem its shares in the period of five years from the initial investment, 
the fund shall be qualified as a closed-ended one.18
Thus, the frequency of redemption right is taken as a decisive element in dif-
ferentiating between an open-ended and closed-ended fund for the purpose of 
the AIFMD, but as a compromise between the ESMA and the European Com-
mission, it is set rather loosely, on the period of five years from the initial of-
fering. Investors of the closed-ended funds usually have the option to sell their 
shares on the secondary market or otherwise, but as it is not the fund which 
purchases these units, it cannot be qualified as the redemption of the shares. 
13 Ibid., par. 12.
14 Letter from the European Commission to the European Securities and Markets Authority 
concerning draft RTS to determine types of alternative investment fund managers, 4 Jul. 2013, 
[https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/ec_letter_to_esma_re_draft_
rts_on_types_of_aifmd_4_july_2013.pdf], accessed on 23/10/2020.
15 Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 694/2014 of 17 December 2013 supplement-
ing Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with regard to regu-
latory technical standards determining types of alternative investment fund managers, (OJ L 
183, 24/6/2014).
16 Preambule, par. 4. of the Regulation (EU) No 694/2014.
17 Article  1, par. 2. of the Regulation (EU) No 694/2014.
18 Article  1, par. 5. of the Regulation (EU) No 694/2014.
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It is clear that the legal form of the fund is practically irrelevant from the EU 
legislator’s point of view and it is not linked with the definition of open-end-
ed or closed-ended fund which is considered relevant for determining further 
AIFM’s obligations regarding these funds. 
From the investor’s point of view, besides the redemption policy, investors 
shall make their choice where to invest depending on the amount of money 
which they are ready to invest, assets and investment strategy the fund applies, 
the tax regime on the investment, the liability for the obligation of the fund, 
the amount of the return which he could expect on the investment and other.19 
Further, the possibility to influence the management of the fund could also be 
one of the decisive factors for choosing the fund, especially for professional 
investors. Investors of the funds with legal personality acquire the membership 
rights and enter the sphere of company law. Thus, they enjoy shareholders’ 
rights to the extent provided by applicable national law.20 However, for inves-
tors of open-ended funds, the control rights become even less important in 
comparison to shareholders in the regular joint-stock company due to their 
exit right, i.e. their right to redeem the shares. In fact, it is considered that 
the redemption right itself represents a tool for disciplining fund managers, 
as they are under constant pressure to ensure that the fund’s investments are 
liquid.21 On the other side, the control right and contractual protections be-
come stronger and more important to investors if they don’t have effective 
exit rights.22 In other words, control rights are far more important for investors 
of the closed-ended funds. This is so irrespective of the actual legal form in 
which the fund is established. 
19 See generally Kirk, E.: Open-ended versus closed-ended funds – what’s the difference?, 
Equity, 33 (10) 2019,  p. 8; Wegman, H.: Investor protection: towards additional EU regulation 
of investment funds?, Leiden, 2016, p. 279.
20 Wegman, H., Investor protection: towards additional EU regulation of investment funds?, 
op. cit., p. 314.
21 Deli, D. N., Varma, R.: Closed-end versus open-end: the choice of organizational form, 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 8 2002, p. 3. Redemption restrictions could be provided in the 
contract with the investors. Those protection rights are usually negotiated for the protection of 
the AIFM that have immediate liquidity. Therefore, investors are willing to wait for some peri-
od time for the payment. This is very important for the AIFM – if they do not have this clause 
negotiated, AIFM has to start the process of liquidation of the AIF regarding the insufficient 
funds. See Lavoie, G.: Should Private Venture fund Managers import the mutual funds and 
hedge fund open-ended structure?, Montreal, 2015,  p. 9., [https://www.lavery.ca/upload/pdf/
lavoieguillaume/EMBA-FinalPaper-FINAL.PDF], accessed on 13/6/2020.
22 Morley, J.: The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Struc-
ture and Regulation, The Yale Law Journal, 123 (5) 2014, p. 1246, [https://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5621&context=ylj], accessed on 05/05/2020.                                                
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To conclude, investors shall choose the fund depending on various factors. The 
prevailing factor is most certainly the redemption right and its frequency. Ex-
cept for professional investors who typically search for investment in specific 
assets, possibly illiquid, the control right over the investment process is less 
relevant for the majority of investors. Authors shall further research whether 
national law regulations regarding the legal form which supports open-end-
ed or closed-ended funds can further influence the choice of the investor as 
well as the decision of fund managers in which legal and organizational form 
should the fund be established.
4. FUNDS ESTABLISHED IN THE LEGAL FORM OF THE JOINT-
STOCK COMPANIES – OPEN-ENDED OR CLOSED-ENDED 
FUNDS?
In this chapter authors selected two jurisdictions that are prominent for the 
investment fund industry in the EU, and which both offer open-ended and 
closed-ended funds in the legal form of the joint-stock company. The first 
one is Germany with its Investmentaktiengesellschaft (further in text: Invest-
ment-AG), which we follow in its transition from the closed-ended towards the 
open-end fund.23 The second is Luxembourg which simultaneously offers So-
ciété d’Investissement à Capital Variable (further in text: SICAV) as incorpo-
rated investment funds with open-end principle and Société d’Investissement 
à Capital Fixe (further in text: SICAF), as incorporated investment funds with 
closed-end principle.
4.1. ANALYSIS OF GERMAN INVESTMENTAKTIENGESELLSCHAFT 
FUND – FROM THE CLOSED-ENDED TO AN OPEN-ENDED 
INVESTMENT VEHICLE
The possibility to establish the fund in the legal form of the joint-stock com-
pany was firstly introduced in 1998 by the KAGG 1998, under the name In-
23 In Germany is possible to establish two types of investment funds in the form of a com-
mercial company. The first one is the aforementioned Investment-AG in the legal form of joint-
stock company with legal personality, while the second is the so-called Investmentkommandit-
gesellschaft in the legal form of a limited partnership company without legal personality. See 
Raab, W.: Kapitalverwaltungsgesellschaft (KVG), in: Raab, W., Grundlagen des Investment-
fondsgeschäftes, Frankfurt am Main, 2019, p. 34. In this article the focus is put on the Invest-
ment-AG, as it also serves as a good comparative example for Croatian closed-end investment 
funds which can be established in the legal form of a joint-stock company.
Intereulaweast, Vol. VII (2) 2020
174
vestmentaktiengesellschaft (further in text: Investment-AG).24  It had its own 
legal personality.25 The investors of the Investment-AG in KAGG 1998 had no 
redemption rights,26 which meant that this fund was initially a closed-ended in-
vestment fund. It was considered that no redemption right shall be particularly 
advantageous for venture capital funds which often practice longer lock-up 
periods for their investments.27 Thus, German legislator wanted to boost the 
venture capital industry by creating the Investment-AG which would, hope-
fully, invest in German companies.28 The compromise towards investors was 
that the shares of the Investment-AG could be offered publicly through the 
exchange market.29 Such a solution should provide investors with the liquidity 
of their shares on the secondary market.30             
However, the Investment-AG as regulated by the KAGG 1998 was not suc-
cessful in practice and not even one was established based upon it.31 This was 
primarily due to the strict requirements for the investment of the capital which 
limited its investment opportunities in the long term.32 Generally, it was per-
ceived that Investment-AG offers no new competitive advantages in compar-
ison to already existing funds without legal personality (Sondervermőgen)33
24 Dritte Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, 24/03/1998 (BGBI I S. 529) (further in text: FMFG). 
The Investment –AG was thus introduced in the Gesetz über Kapitalanlagegesellschaften, 
09/09/1998 (BGBI. I S.2726 (further in text KAGG 1998).
25 Gruhn, A. M.: Die deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft – Ein Investmentfondsprodukt 
im Mantel einer Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin, 2011, p. 2.
26 No redemption right for investors stems out from the interpretation of the §51 par. 2 of the 
KAGG 1998.
27 Kaplan, S. N., Stromberg, P.: Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, in: Bratton, W.W., 
McCahery, J.A. (ur.) Institutional Investor Activism, Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Eco-
nomics and Regulation, Oxford, 2015, str. 493.
28 Thoma, G. G., Steck, K-U., The German Investmentaktiengesellschaft (closed-end fund): 
Investment Alternative or Legislative Failure?, University of Pennsylvania Journal of Interna-
tional Economic Law, 23 (1) 2002, p. 25.
29 § 61 par. 3 of the KAGG 1998.
30 See Fock, T., Hartig, H., Ist die Investmentaktiengesellschaft überhaupt eine Aktiengesell-
schaft? In: Wachter, T. (ed), Festschrift für Sebastian Spiegelberger zum 70. Geburtstag, Zerb, 
2009, p. 654.
31 See Sachtleber, O. W.: Zivilrechtliche Strukturen von open-end-Investmentfonds in 
Deutschland und England, Göttingen, 2011, p. 102.
32 See Hermanns, M.: Die Investmentaktiengesellschaft nach dem Investmentmodernisie-
rungsgesetz – eine neue Gesellschaftsform, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, 2004, p. 1297.
33 See Fock, T., Hartig, H., Ist die Investmentaktiengesellschaft überhaupt eine Aktiengesell-
schaft?, op. cit., p. 655. 
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In 2003, German legislator revised the provisions relating to Investment-AG,34 
where one of the major changes was the introduction of the Investment-AG 
with variable capital (Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit veränderlichem Kap-
ital).35 This represented the revolution in German company law as well, as it 
introduced some of the fundamental changes in the legal form of the joint-
stock company for Investment-AG.36 The most important change for investors 
was the introduction of the redemption right,37 which should make these funds 
less risky from the investors’ point of view. However, the redemption right 
can be restricted, under the condition that this restriction is regulated in the 
articles of association of the particular Investment-AG, stating for example that 
the shares can be redeemed on certain dates only, but at least once quarterly.38 
The possibility of restricting the redemption right is specifically designed for 
private equity funds that invest in illiquid assets, such as private companies.39
Further, the management of the Investment-AG with variable capital is autho-
rized to continuously issue new shares until the company’s share capital reach-
es the maximum as set in the articles of association,40 without the need of prior 
authorization by the general meeting. It is considered that this authorization 
is set forth in the articles of association, and thus it is not necessary to obtain 
it again from the shareholders.41 The shareholders don’t have the subscription 
right on new shares.42 Also, the company share capital is raised by issuance of 
new shares, without prior registration of the increase of the share capital as it 
is necessary for the traditional joint-stock company.43 The shares can be issued 
34 Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Investmentwesens und zur Besteuerung von Investment-
vermögen (Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz) (BGBl. I 2003 S. 2676) (further in text: InvG 
2003).
35 §§ 104-106 InvG 2003. See also Fromm, A.: Die Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit verän-
derlichem Kapital, Frankfurt am Main, 2008, p. 16.
36 See Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, in Schimansky, H., Bunte, H-J., 
Lwowski, H-J. (eds): Bankrechts-Handbuch, München, 2017, Rn 235.
37 See also Hermanns, M.: Die Investmentaktiengesellschaft nach dem Investmentmoderni-
sierungsgesetz – eine neue Gesellschaftsform,, op. cit., p. 1300.
38 Loc. cit. See §116 of InvG 2003.
39 See Baums, T., Kiem, R.: Die Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit veränderlichem Kapital, 
Arbeitspapiere, Nr. 118, 2003, Institut für Bankrecht, p. 13, [https://d-nb.info/1059711699/34], 
accessed on 22/07/2020.
40 See § 105 par. 1 of the InvG 2003. 
41 See also Hermanns, M.: Die Investmentaktiengesellschaft nach dem Investmentmoderni-
sierungsgesetz – eine neue Gesellschaftsform, op. cit., p. 1298.
42 See § 104 par. 2. of the InvG 2003.
43 See also Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, op. cit., Rn. 236.
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only after full payment.44 As the ground capital of the Investment-AG is in 
constant change, it has the obligation to determine the net asset value at least 
once a week and to publish this data on relevant official registers and relevant 
newspapers for investors.45
However, there were only a few Investment-AG established under the InvG 
2003.46 It seems that investors were not willing to be the first to use this le-
gal form for conducting investment business and it did not help that the legal 
framework was considered to be unsatisfactory and fragmented, and not in the 
line with its role model – the Luxembourgian SICAV (especially regarding the 
possibility to have external managers).47 
Thus, further major amendments to Investment-AG were introduced in 2007.48 
The first most notable difference was that the shares of the Investment-AG 
were differentiated into two main classes: Unternehmensaktien and Anlageak-
tien. Holders of Unternehmensaktien are the only ones with the voting rights 
at the general meeting,49 while the holders of the Anlageaktien are passive 
investors who invest in the Investment-AG with the only goal to obtain prof-
its without the participation in the company as their shareholders.50 In other 
words, most investors cannot influence the decisions of the management of 
the Investment-AG, as the shareholders of the traditional joint-stock compa-
ny would be able (regardless of how low this influence could in fact be). On 
the other hand, the fund initiator or the institutional investor who holds the 
Unternehmensaktien can influence the management and investment policy of 
the fund as a shareholder. This can make Investment-AG more attractive to 
professional investors. Also, it solves the challenge of having passive investors/
shareholders in corporate governance of the incorporated funds, which is a 
common occurrence in the investment business.51 In each case, the distinc-
tion between the shares of the Investment-AG leads to the conclusion that the 
44 See §103 par. 1. of the InvG 2003.
45 See §103 par. 3. of the InvG 2003.
46 Gruhn, A. M.: Die deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft – Ein Investmentfondsprodukt 
im Mantel einer Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit., p. 8.
47 Steck, K-U., Fisher, C.: Better than SICAV, International Financial Law Review, 29 (1) 
2010, p. 58.
48 Gesetz zur Änderung des Investmentgesetzes und zur Anpassung anderer Vorschriften 
(Investmentänderungsgesetz), BGBl. I 2007 S. 3089 (further in text: InvG 2007).
49 § 96, par. 1b of InvG 2007.
50 See Fischer, C., Steck, K-U.: § 96 InvG, in: Berger, H., Steck, K-U. (eds), Investmentgesetz, 
Investmentsteuergesetz, München, 2010, Rn 3 and further. 
51 Spangler, T.: The Law of Private Investment Funds, Third Edition, Oxford, 2018, p. 4
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choice of the legal form of funds becomes even less relevant for investors who 
are not interested in active participation in the incorporated funds.52
The second most important change was the introduction of the possibility of 
external management of the Investment-AG ( fremdverwaltete Investmentak-
tiengesellschaft).53 The external manager does not become an organ of the In-
vestment-AG, i.e. it does not replace the management of the Investment-AG.54 
The introduction of the external manager (the management company or the 
so-called Kapitalanlagegesellschaft) brings out the question of the potential 
liability of the external manager towards the Investment-AG and its share-
holders. German legal scholars argue that the liability for investment policy 
and administration remains primarily on the organs of the Investment-AG, 
and not on the external manager.55 It is certainly very interesting to see if in a 
particular case the shareholders could build a case towards both the manage-
ment company of the Investment-AG and the external manager. Campbell and 
Müchler argue that the relationship between Investment-AG and the external 
manager is contractual, where they qualify the contract as the so-called Ges-
chäftsbesorgungsvertrag. Thus, in their opinion, the liability of the external 
manager lies in the infringement of the relevant articles of that contract.56 One 
should bear in mind that both Investment-AG with internal or external manag-
ers must have a supervisory board, which has a primary role, as in traditional 
joint-stock companies, to supervise the management of the Investment-AG and 
to safeguard the interest of the investors/shareholders.57
These changes significantly boosted the popularity of Investment-AG with 
variable capital, as from 2007 till now there were a significant number of them 
established in Germany.58
52 See also Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, op. cit., Rn. 234.
53 § 96 par. 4 of the InvG 2007.
54 See Campbell, N., Müchler, H.: Die Haftung der Verwaltungsgesellschaft einer fremdver-
walteten Investmentaktiengesellschaft, Institute for Law and Finance, Working Paper Series 
No. 101, 04/2009, p. 5., [https://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/fileadmin/_migrated/content_uploads/
ILF_WP_101.pdf], accessed 20/07/2020. 
55 See also Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, op. cit., Rn. 228.
56 Campbell, N., Müchler, H.: Die Haftung der Verwaltungsgesellschaft einer fremdverwal-
teten Investmentaktiengesellschaft, op. cit., p. 3. 
57 See Gruhn, A. M.: Die deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft – Ein Investmentfondspro-
dukt im Mantel einer Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit., p. 39.
58 Steck, K-U., Fisher, C.: Better than SICAV, op. cit., p. 58. See also Gruhn, A. M.: Die 
deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft – Ein Investmentfondsprodukt im Mantel einer Aktien-
gesellschaft, op. cit., p. 12. 
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Lastly, the Investment-AG with fixed capital has been abolished as it has not 
been used in practice.59 One of the main reasons is that because of the no-re-
demption rule, investing in such funds was viewed as riskier for the investors,60 
regardless of the potential liquidity of the shares on the secondary market (via 
the exchange market). 
However, in 2013, the InvG was replaced with the new law – Kapitalanlagege-
setzbuch (further in text: KAGB), which is currently in force with some amend-
ments.61 The KAGB again introduced the Investment-AG with fixed capital.62 
Regardless of the fact that it was significantly less popular in practice, some 
authors argue that it still represents the investment vehicle suitable for private 
equity and venture capital funds who invest in illiquid assets which makes the 
redemption right extremely burdensome for the fund.63 Thus, currently, under 
the KAGB, it is possible to establish four company types of investment funds 
in Germany: Investment-AG with open and closed-end type and Investment-
kommanditgesellschaft with open and closed-end type.64 
In all the legislative changes regarding the Investment-AG with both fixed and 
variable capital, the German legislator inserted a significant deviance from 
the traditional joint-stock company. It is a provision abrogating the rule that 
the articles of association may deviate from the default legal provisions for 
a joint-stock company only if such a possibility is expressly provided by the 
law.65 By leaving one of the fundamental principles for joint-stock companies, 
the legislator opened a way to easily introduce changes in the otherwise formi-
dable structure of the joint-stock company in German law. However, by doing 
so, some authors pose the question as to whether we can designate the Invest-
ment-AG as the joint-stock company at all or the legislator has in fact created a 
completely new legal form when introducing the Investment-AG.66
59 See Fischer, C., Steck, K-U.: § 96 InvG, op. cit., p. 841.
60 See also Hermanns, M.: Die Investmentaktiengesellschaft nach dem Investmentmoderni-
sierungsgesetz – eine neue Gesellschaftsform, op. cit.,p. 1302.
61 Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch vom 4. Juli 2013 (BGBl. I S. 1981), das zuletzt durch Artikel 5 des 
Gesetzes vom 19. März 2020 (BGBl. I S. 529) geändert worden ist.
62 See §§ 140-148 of the KAGB.
63 See Gruhn, A. M.: Die deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft – Ein Investmentfondspro-
dukt im Mantel einer Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit., p. 70.
64 See Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, op. cit., Rn. 224.
65 See § 108 par. 2 and § 140 par. 2 of the KAGB abrogating the § 23 par. 5 of the Aktieng-
esetz (Aktiengesetz vom 6. September 1965 (BGBl. I S. 1089), das zuletzt durch Artikel 1 des 
Gesetzes vom 12. Dezember 2019 (BGBl. I S. 2637) geändert worden ist).
66 See Fock, T., Hartig, H., Ist die Investmentaktiengesellschaft überhaupt eine Aktiengesell-
schaft?, op. cit., p. 659.
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It is clear that the company law and the capital market law for Investment-AG 
are overlapping. However, the KAGB is the lex specialis for investment funds.67 
The Investment-AG is the child of capital market law, where we primarily 
analyze all the specifics relating to the investment business, while its legal 
form of the joint-stock company comes into consideration as of secondary im-
portance.68 For example, one of the major differences between the traditional 
German joint-stock company and the Investment-AG is the redemption right 
of the investors (for Investment-AG with variable capital) and the possibility of 
external management. Thus, the authors are free to conclude that in practice it 
is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the investment funds and the position 
of its investors/shareholders by analyzing the legal forms of the incorporated 
funds solely. One should primarily take into account all the specifics of the 
investment business, as in the authors’ opinion, it takes precedence over the 
chosen form of the investment fund.
4.2. ANALYSIS OF LUXEMBOURG SICAV AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN 
OPEN-ENDED FUND WITH VARIABLE CAPITAL IN THE LEGAL 
FORM OF THE JOINT-STOCK COMPANY
Luxembourg is today one of the most prominent centers for the investment 
fund industry in Europe. The first open-ended incorporated investment fund 
was founded in 1959.69 The development of open-ended incorporated funds 
can be traced through several legislative changes. In 1983 Luxembourg ad-
opted the first law which nominated the existing open-end incorporated fund 
in the legal form of the joint-stock company as SICAV.70 This law was subse-
quently replaced in 1988 (further in text: Loi 1988)71, in 2002 (further in text: 
67 See §108 par. 2 of the KAGB.
68 See also Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, op. cit., Rn. 225. See also 
Gruhn, A. M.: Die deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft – Ein Investmentfondsprodukt im 
Mantel einer Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit., p. 32. 
69 Rounds, C. E., Dehio, A.: Publicly-Traded Open End Mutual Funds in Common Law and 
Civil Jurisdictions: A Comparison of Legal Structures, New York University Journal of Law & 
Business, 3 (2) 2007, p. 501. The first investment funds were not even regulated by the law, but 
rather by decisions of the Ministry of Finance, through Décisions du ministre des Finances du 
13 février 1959 et du 9 février 1960. For development of the Luxembourg investment funds see 
also Elvinger, J., Schmit, I. M. : Les Sociétés de Gestion d’organismes de Placement Collectif 
en Droit Luxembourgeois, Droit bancaire et financier au Luxembourg, 4 2004, p. 1497. 
70 Art. 44 of the Loi du 25 août 1983 relative aux organismes de placement collectif.
71 Loi du 30 mars 1988 relative aux organismes de placement collectif
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Loi 2002)72 and the current law concerning the investment funds is the Loi du 
17 décembre 2010 concernant les organismes de placement collectif (further 
in text: Loi 2010), with the latest amendment in 2019.73
Both SICAV and SICAF have a legal personality. However, while the SICAV 
can be established in the legal form of the joint-stock company (société ano-
nyme) or Societas Europaea only, the SICAF can be established in many legal 
forms, most often as a joint-stock company, limited liability company, or lim-
ited partnership.74 Thus, SICAF is a term that relates to all types of closed-
end incorporated investment funds. As the term SICAF is too general, it is 
used in legal theory but not in the legal sources. Investment funds that fall in 
the category of SICAFs are closer to traditional legal forms of commercial 
companies, with fewer deviances from the company law.75 In other words, in 
practice, that means that SICAFs are perceived as less liquid investment funds, 
as they more often do not provide a redemption right to the investors. In this 
article, the authors shall put the accent on the analysis of SICAV, which can be 
established in the legal form of the joint-stock company only, for the purpose 
of comparison to German Investment-AG and Croatian AIF in the form of the 
joint-stock company.
Luxembourg provisions applying on SICAV have remained in the most part 
the same throughout all the legislative changes, which means that the Luxem-
bourg legislator achieved to create a very popular investment vehicle from the 
beginning of its introduction. Thus, it is of no surprise that it served as a role 
model for German Investment-AG with variable capital.76 The most important 
common feature is that investors have the right to redeem their shares, where 
possible restrictions of redemption can be introduced only in the articles of 
the association of the SICAV.77 The share capital is constantly changing due 
to emission of the new shares and redemption on demand, but the change of 
the share capital is automatically done, without the need to publish the new 
72 Loi du 20 décembre 2002 concernant les organismes de placement collectif et modifiant la 
loi modifiée du 12 février 1979 concernant la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée.
73 Loi du 8 avril 2019 relative à des mesures à prendre en relation avec le secteur financier 
en cas de retrait du Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande du Nord de l’Union eu-
ropéenne et modifiant: 1° la loi modifiée du 13 février 2007 relative aux fonds d’investissement 
spécialisés; et 2° la loi modifiée du 17 décembre 2010 concernant les organismes de placement 
collectif.
74 Kremer, C., Lebbe, I.: Organismes De Placement Collectif et Véhicules d’investissement 
apparentés en droit luxembourgeois, Larcier, 2007, p. 89. 
75 Ibid., p. 278.
76 See also Köndgen, J., Schmies, C.: § 113. Investmentgeschäft, op. cit., Rn. 235.
77 See art. 27 of the Loi 1988., art. 28 of the Loi 2002. and art. 28 of the Loi 2010.
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amounts of share capital in official registers as would be the case for tradition-
al joint-stock companies. Also, no prior authorization by the general meeting 
is necessary.78 Investors/shareholders don’t have subscription rights on the new 
shares.79 SICAV, under the condition it is an umbrella fund, can issue shares 
with different values, which is yet another exception from the Luxembourg 
company law.80
SICAV is subject to the application of both company law provisions regarding 
the joint-stock company and capital market law governing the investment vehi-
cles. However, as in the case of Germany, company law provisions81 apply only 
as lex generalis, where investment funds law has an advantage and can dero-
gate company law provisions.82 Thus, as already demonstrated, many company 
law provisions for the joint-stock company are derogated.
SICAV which has an external manager still has its own management as other 
joint-stock companies. The SICAV’s management can delegate the daily man-
agement of the company and the investments, administrative tasks, and others, 
but it cannot fully delegate its powers to third persons.83 Depending on the ex-
tent of the delegation, it retains certain tasks as the approval of concluding cer-
tain contracts, supervision over the management of the company’s assets, and 
others. However, regardless of the delegation of various management tasks, 
their liability towards investors/shareholders and third persons practically re-
main the same.84 Thus, the fact that the SICAV is externally managed, does not 
exclude the SICAV’s management of the liability that managers usually have 
in the traditional joint-stock companies. On the other hand, external managers 
are liable primarily towards the SICAV based on their contract, which is in 
theory primarily classified as a contrat de mandat.85 
Redemption, i.e. liquidity of the shares proves to be an important factor for 
investors of Luxembourg SICAV and SICAF. Despite the fact that shares of 
SICAF can be traded on the exchange market, the SICAV remain the most 
78 Kremer, C., Lebbe, I.: Organismes De Placement Collectif et Véhicules d’investissement 
apparentés en droit luxembourgeois, op. cit., p. 277.
79 See art. 28 of the Loi 1988., art. 29 of the Loi 2002. and art. 29 of the Loi 2010.
80 Kremer, C., Lebbe, I.: Organismes De Placement Collectif et Véhicules d’investissement 
apparentés en droit luxembourgeois, op. cit., p. 251.
81 Loi du 10 août 1915 concernant les sociétés commerciales.
82 See art. 25 of the Loi 1988., art. 26 of the Loi 2002. and art. 26 of the Loi 2010.
83 Kremer, C., Lebbe, I.: Organismes De Placement Collectif et Véhicules d’investissement 
apparentés en droit luxembourgeois, op. cit., p. 319.
84 Ibid., p. 366.
85 Ibid., p. 375.
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popular investment vehicle in practice.86 This follows the conclusion for Ger-
man investment vehicles, where Investment-AG with variable capital as the 
open-end incorporated funds is far more attractive to investors than Invest-
ment-Ag with fixed capital.   
5. INVESTORS AS SHAREHOLDERS – SOME OPEN ISSUES
Corporate governance of the incorporated fund is often a neglected topic. The 
relation between investors/shareholders and the management of the incorpo-
rated fund is an open issue. Their relation primarily depends on the type of the 
company which serves as a legal vehicle for the fund and applicable national 
legislation. The last may significantly vary regarding the national provisions 
for alternative investment funds and regarding the company law, as both areas 
are predominantly left to the national legislation of the EU Member States.87
The control right of the investors is primarily expressed through their voting 
right on the general meeting where they are able to express their discontent with 
the management of the fund, but except in cases when the investors are major 
shareholders, influence through voting rights cannot be considered as an effec-
tive tool of investors’ protection.88 For open-ended funds, as argued previously, 
the redemption right itself can serve as the best tool of control over managers. 
It is a common practice that incorporated funds, particularly the German In-
vestment-AG and the Luxembourg SICAV,89 have an external manager. That 
brings out the question of whom and to which extent safeguards the interest of 
investors – fund’s management or the external manager, and the scope of the 
duties still retained by the management. The answer depends on the national 
regulation where the incorporated fund is founded, in particular, upon the legal 
nature of the relation between the management and the external manager and 
the issue of liability towards investors. 
86 Guide de l’investisseur, Instruments financiers, [https://www.ing.lu/webing/content/
dam/ing/PDF/personal/invest/investor-guide/guide_de_l_investisseur_fr.pdf], accessed on 
03/09/2020, p. 9.
87 The AIFMD regulated managers, but leaves the regulation of alternative investment funds 
to national regulators. As to the EU company law, only some aspects of the companies are 
harmonised, primarily relating to joint-stock companies. For advantages and disadvantages of 
the harmonisation of the EU company law see in Grundmann, S.: European Company Law, 
Organisation, Finance and Capital Markets, Antwerpen-Oxford, 2007, p. 96.
88 Wegman, H., Investor protection: towards additional EU regulation of investment funds?, 
op. cit.,p. 274.
89 Steck, K-U., Fisher, C.: Better than SICAV, op. cit., p. 58.  Also, all Croatian incorporated 
funds have external managers.
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Generally, the role of the management in incorporated funds is controversial. 
It is argued that there are significant differences in comparison to the role and 
duties of management in traditional joint-stock companies.90 Some even argue 
that investment funds should be regarded as products, and not as legal entities 
for which one should consider challenges of governance at all.91 
We can also discuss whether it is better for the interest of the investors to 
have managers of the fund who are independent of the external manager.92 
For starters, that would mean that the managers of the fond and the external 
managers are different persons. The potential benefit of independent manag-
ers would certainly be the representation of investors’ interest, negotiation of 
management fees, and others. In the authors’ opinion, the composition of the 
management of the incorporated fund is of crucial meaning for promoting and 
representing the interests of investors/shareholders in the incorporated funds.
On the other hand, it is an open issue whether investors/shareholders have the 
duty to act in the interest of the company (the incorporated fund) at all. This 
is due to the request that the investment fund (or its management company) 
must act in the interest of the investors, and presumably surpass the interest 
of the fund, which is a legal standard inserted through the EU legislation and 
thus present in the legislations of all the Member States.93 In other words, the 
interest of the incorporated fund in the form of the joint-stock company be-
comes irrelevant in comparison to the interest of its investors/shareholders. If 
the management must be oriented towards the interest of the shareholders, then 
it would be very hard to argue that investors/shareholders should not act in 
self-interest, but in the interest of the fund/company. Such findings drastically 
differ from the traditional rethinking of the corporate governance in joint-
stock companies, and further evidence that the position of investors should not 
be equaled to the position of a shareholder, regardless of the legal form of the 
incorporated fund.
Finally, most countries have developed corporate governance codices for com-
panies that trade publicly on the exchange market. In the authors’ opinion, these 
90 Johnson, L. P. Q., Protecting mutual fund investors: an inevitable eclecticism, in: Birdthis-
tle, W. A., Morley, J. (eds), Research Handbook on the Regulation of Mutual Funds, Chelten-
ham, 2018, p. 151.
91 For an overview see Krig, A. K.: Toward better mutual fund governance, in Birdthistle, 
W. A., Morley, J. (eds): Research Handbook on the Regulation of Mutual Funds, Cheltenham, 
2018, p. 186.
92 Spangler, T.: The Law of Private Investment Funds, op. cit., p. 261.
93 Zetzsche, D.: Das Gesellschaftsrecht des Kapitalanlagegesetzbuches, Die Aktienge-
sellschaft, 17 2013, p. 615. See also Gruhn, A. M.: Die deutsche Investmentaktiengesellschaft 
– Ein Investmentfondsprodukt im Mantel einer Aktiengesellschaft, op. cit., p. 35. 
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codices should apply to incorporated funds which are listed on the exchange 
market as well,94 as the protection of possible investors is equally needed when 
both the traditional joint-stock company and the investment fund incorporated 
as a joint-stock company offer their shares to the public on the exchange mar-
ket. For example, Croatian incorporated funds that are listed on the exchange 
market are obliged to apply the Corporate governance code.95 Being listed on 
the exchange market brings at least two benefits to the investors/shareholders. 
The first one is the supervision that the rules of the exchange market are fol-
lowed which by itself helps in enhancing the corporate governance of the in-
corporated fund. The other is the liquidity of the shares achieved by secondary 
trading, where the liquidity heavily depends on the market itself.96 
On the other side, incorporated funds with the private placement are off the 
grid completely. In the authors’ opinion, legislators should put a bigger focus 
on the issues of corporate governance of all incorporated funds, as they repre-
sent specific legal vehicles that more often than not significantly deviate from 
the regulation for traditional legal forms in which they are incorporated. 
6. CROATIAN PERSPECTIVE
The Croatian experience is determined by the development of fund regula-
tions, which began in 1995 with the adoption of the first Investment Funds Act 
[further in text: IFA 1].97 IFA 1 distinguished open-ended funds, which were 
a separate pool of assets without legal personality, and closed-ended funds, 
which could only be established as a joint-stock company whose shares are 
registered and unlimitedly transferable, and the fund can’t issue preferred 
shares or shares with different rights.98 A closed-ended fund had a manage-
ment board with two members, appointed by the management company, and 
a supervisory board whose members jointly represent the closed-ended fund 
towards the management company.99 According to the provisions of IFA 1, no 
closed-ended funds were ever established in Croatia, but in 1997 a special Law 
94 See also Spangler, T., The Law of Private Investment Funds, op. cit., p. 9.
95 Croatian Corporate governance code, [https://zse.hr/UserDocsImages/legal/Corporate%20
Governance%20Code-eng2010.pdf], accessed on 03/09/2020.
96 See also Spangler, T., The Law of Private Investment Funds, op. cit., p. 280.
97 Investment Funds Act was amended twice - in 1996 and 2001 – Official Gazzette 107/95, 
12/96 and 114/01.
98 Article 39. and article 43. IFA 1.
99 Article 46. IFA 1.
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on Privatization Investment Funds was passed [further in text: LPIF],100 which 
enabled the establishment of privatization funds, also in the form of joint-stock 
companies and on the basis of which numerous privatization funds were estab-
lished in Croatia. Privatization funds were managed by management compa-
nies in accordance with LPIF and IFA 1, which appointed the management and 
the first supervisory board of the privatization funds, and were established for 
a fixed period of time (five years) after which time they had to be transformed 
into “classic” closed-ended funds according to IFA 1. Neither IFA 1 nor LPIF 
specifically regulated the rights of shareholders of closed-ended funds, so pro-
visions of the Companies Act101 were applied in that matter as a lex generalis.
In 2005, a new Law on Investment Funds [further in text: IFA 2] was adopt-
ed,102 which transposed the UCITS III directive into Croatian legislation, and 
which distinguished between open-ended investment funds as a separate pool 
of assets without legal personality (they could be established as an open-ended 
investment fund with a public offering,103 an open-ended investment fund with 
a private offering and open-ended private equity fund with a private offering) 
and closed-ended investment fund as funds with a public offering.104 For all 
these fund types, IFA 2 prescribed fairly detailed permitted investments lim-
itation on investment.
A closed-ended investment fund with a public offering once again had to be 
established as a joint-stock company that can issue only ordinary registered 
shares, granting shareholders equal rights, as provided for by the law, prospec-
tus, and fund rules, and may not issue any other type of securities.105 This time, 
IFA 2 proscribed that the shares of the closed-ended investment fund with a 
public offering shall be admitted to official listing on the stock exchange or 
another regulated market open to the public.106 IFA 2 has prescribed in great 
detail the membership of the fund’s supervisory board and its competence,107 
so the supervisory board members, in addition to the competence of the super-
100 Official Gazzette 109/97 and 114/01. Seven privatization investment funds were estab-
lished: Sunce zif d.d., Velebit zif d.d., Dom Holding zif d.d., Središnji nacionalni fond zif d.d., 
Pleter zif d.d., Expandia zif d.d. i Slavonski zif d.d.  
101 Companies Act, Official Gazette, Nos. 111/93, 34/99, 121/99, 52/00, 118/03, 107/07, 146/08, 
137/09, 125/11, 152/11, 111/12, 68/13, 110/15, 40/19.
102 Official Gazzette 150/05.
103 UCITS fund was open-ended investment fund with a public offering, all others were alter-
native investment funds.
104 Article 2. IFA 2.
105 Article 60. and article 64. IFA 2.
106 Article 64. IFA 2.
107 Articles 69. – 75. IFA 2.
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visory board granted under the Companies Act, jointly represented the fund 
in relation to the management company. Besides, IFA 2 explicitly prescribed 
various oversight duties of the supervisory board.108 The question of fund man-
agement was foreseen in a very interesting and controversial way - the man-
agement board of the management company had the authority, was appointed 
and acted as the management board of the fund, and managed the fund in 
accordance with the contract concluded between the management company 
and the fund.109 The supervisory board represents the fund when concluding 
this contract. 
As far as shareholder rights are concerned IFA 2 prescribed that the Compa-
nies Act shall apply on the competence, convening, and holding of the general 
meeting. However, the general meeting may make valid decisions only if votes 
representing at least 3/10 of the registered capital of the fund are present at the 
general meeting.110 The general meeting also had the right to make specific de-
cisions (based on the votes representing at least three-quarters of the registered 
capital, present at the fund’s general meeting at the time of decision making): 
increase in the annual fee to the management company, change in investment 
objectives of the fund (concerning the objectives indicated in the prospectus), 
acquisition of fund’s own shares for the purpose of their redemption, the exten-
sion of the fund’s operation relative to the period indicated in the prospectus, 
merger into and consolidation with another fund, i.e. division of the fund.111 
IFA 2 also provided special rules for real estate funds, which could only be 
established as closed-ended funds with a public offering for investment in real 
estate, and had to invest more than 60% of the fund’s net asset value in real 
estate. 112
It is evident from the above-listed competencies of the funds’ general meet-
ing and supervisory board that IFA 2 gave investors/shareholders significant-
ly greater powers regarding issues that fall within direct fund management, 
i.e. issues that directly affect them. In that period, several closed-ended funds 
were established in Croatia, but only as real estate funds – Quaestus nekret-
108 For example supervision over the compliance of business operations, as well as the objec-
tives and limitations on investment of an individual fund (!), approving of decisions concerning 
the share redemption, share issue and fund restructuring at the fund’s general meeting, com-
munication with the Supervisory Authority any failure of to comply with IFA 2 and relevant 
regulations.
109 Article 76. IFA 2.
110 Article 85. IFA 2.
111 Article 86 IFA 2.
112 Article 80. IFA 2.
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nine d.d., ZAIF Proprius d.d., Jadran Kapital d.d., while the privatization funds 
Slavonski ZAIF d.d. and Velebit d.d. harmonized their business operations 
with IFA 2, as well as was with ZAIF Breza d.d., and continued to operate as 
closed-ended funds. 
With Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013, the legislative environment was 
significantly changed and improved, and since then there are two laws gov-
erning investment funds - Open-ended Investment Funds with Public Offering 
Act (further in text: IFPOA 1),113 which regulates UCITS funds, and the Alter-
native Investment Funds Act (further in text: AIFA 1),114 which, unlike many 
EU laws implementing the AIFMD, regulates both management companies 
(AIFM) and AIFs. During this period, many closed-ended funds ceased to ex-
ist due to the transitional provision of AIFA 1 which stipulated that closed-end-
ed investment funds with a public offering established under provisions of IFA 
2, which are undergoing the winding-up procedure on the day of the adoption 
of AIFA 1, and the winding-up procedure is not completed by the entry into 
force of AIFA 1, shall no longer be investment funds within the meaning of the 
provisions of AIFA 1.115
Unfortunately, Croatia then continued on the path set by IFA 1 and IFA 2 
in relation to the definition of closed-ended funds. AIFA 1 wrongly defined 
closed-ended fund as a legal person established in the form of a joint-stock 
company or a limited liability company, which is established by an AIFM 
and managed by an AIFM on behalf and for the account of the AIF, the units 
of which are not redeemable on unit-holders’ request out of the assets of the 
closed-ended AIF.116 Improvement can be seen in the fact that in addition to 
a joint-stock company, the possibility of establishing a closed-end fund in the 
form of a limited liability company has been added, but again, unfortunately, 
other much more appropriate forms have not been recognized, such as a lim-
ited partnership, which corresponds much better to private equity funds. As 
113 Official Gazzette Nos. 16/2013, 143/2014. Today Open-ended Investment Funds with Pub-
lic Offering Act (further in text: IFPOA 2) is in force, Official Gazzette 44/2016 i 126/2019.
114 Official Gazzette 16/2013 and 143/2014. Today Alternative Investment Funds Act (further 
in text:AIFA 2) is in force, Official Gazzette 21/2018.
115 Article 325. AIFA 1. 
116 Article 3. AIFA 1. Open-ended AIF on the other hand means a separate pool of assets, 
without legal personality, constituted by an AIFM and managed by the AIFM in its own name 
and for the joint account of holders of units in such assets in accordance with the provisions 
of this Act, the prospectus and/or the fund rules. Open-ended AIFs may be managed by an 
external AIFM only. Units in an open-ended AIF are, at the request of unit-holders, redeemed, 
directly or indirectly, out of the assets of the open-ended AIF in the manner and under the con-
ditions laid down in the prospectus and/or the fund rules. An open-ended AIF may have legal 
personality if that is allowed by national law of a Member State or a third country.
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previously discussed, the basic criterion for distinguishing open-ended from 
closed-ended AIFs is redemption policy, not the legal personality of the AIF, 
which is expressly stated in the relevant EU documents.117
The dualism of laws applicable to closed-ended funds has continued, where the 
Companies Act applies to closed-ended AIFs as lex generalis and AIFA 1 as 
lex specialis.118 Shares of a closed-ended AIF can be issued in a dematerialized 
form only and they give shareholders the rights established by both the Com-
panies Act and AIFA 1, the prospectus of the fund where applicable, the rules 
of the fund, and the articles of association of the fund.119
The supervisory board of the closed-ended funds received an additional com-
petence - carrying on the activities related to the compulsory transfer of man-
agement of a closed-ended AIF to another AIFM,120 while the relationship 
between the AIFM and the fund management got more complicated. AIFA 1 
prescribed that a closed-ended AIF established as a joint-stock company with 
an external AIFM shall not have the management, because the obligations and 
powers of the traditional management board were imposed and conferred on 
the management board of an AIFM which manages the closed-ended AIF.121 
The AIFM managed the operations of a closed-ended AIF and represented 
it with regard to all matters, except for those where the supervisory board of 
a closed-ended AIF is empowered for the representation of the closed-ended 
AIF. AIFA 2 in 2018 confirmed the same solution.122
The general meeting also received new powers – not only the change of invest-
ment objectives but also the risk profile of the fund; decision on the termina-
tion before the termination date defined in the AIF rules or the extension of 
the operation of the fund established for a fixed period of time; termination of 
the management agreement entered into with an AIFM; the liquidation of an 
AIF and granting approval for the supervisory board’s decision on the transfer 
of management functions to another AIFM.123
Further improvement in this area was achieved in 2018, with the introduction 
of the possibility of establishing closed-ended funds with legal personality 
(still only as a joint-stock company or a limited liability company) and without 
legal personality, as a separate pool of assets whose shares are not redeemable 
117 See Chapter 3 of this Article.
118 Article 112 AIFA 1.
119 Article 113 AIFA 1.
120 Article 121. AIFA 1.
121 Article 115. AIFA 1.
122 Article 100 AIFA 2.
123 Article 123. AIFA 1.
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from AIF assets at the request of investors.124 The first Croatian closed-ended 
fund without legal personality was established in October 2020. 
Currently, there are only four closed-ended AIFs with legal personality in Cro-
atia: Kapitalni fond d.d., ZAIF Proprius d.d., ZAIF Breza d.d., and Slavonski 
ZAIF d.d., while ZAIF Proprius d.d. is in the process of liquidation from April 
2020. All of these funds are established in the legal form of joint-stock com-
panies, for two reasons: 
1.  either they were established in the period of establishment of privatization 
funds 
2.  either they were established in the period from 2006 to 2008, and then ex-
clusively as closed-ended real estate funds (that was the period of great real 
estate boom in Croatia),
and in both cases, legislative framework allowed the establishment of closed-end-
ed funds with a legal personality only in the form of joint-stock companies, not a 
limited liability company. Afterwards, not a single closed-ended fund with legal 
personality was established in Croatia, and only recently (October 2020) one 
fund was established as a closed-ended fund – but this is the fund without legal 
personality and with private placement (private equity fund).
There can be several reasons for this situation, for starters it is easier to raise 
significantly larger funds from the public (i.e. retail investors, that’s why those 
funds were all with public offering), so ZAIF Proprius raised HRK 60 million, 
Quaestus Nekretnine raised as much as HRK 225 million, and Jadran Kapital 
HRK 79 million, while on the other hand, recently established umbrella fund 
with the public offering (but without legal personality) Fima Invest Funds with 
its two sub-funds (Fima Global Income Builder and Fime SEE Income Build-
er) raised only HRK 10 million. Also, the costs of establishing and operating 
funds with legal personality are higher (costs of depositories and stock ex-
change…), before explained dualism of management is present, as well as the 
greater influence of shareholders on the operation of the fund.
Therefore, de lege ferenda, it would be good and useful to allow the estab-
lishment of funds with legal personality in the form of a limited partnership 
(komanditno društvo), which form is the most common in the world when it 
comes to PE/VC funds. That would be, by all means, a significant generator of 
the PE/VC market in Croatia and economic development and progress of the 
companies in which those funds invest (mostly SMEs, start-ups…).
Finally, the current investment fund industry is also under influence of the 
COVID-19. The influence of COVID-19 on the Croatian investment fund indus-
124 Article 4. AIFA 2.
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try is best shown from the following figures125 - from 1/3/2020 to 30/6/2020 NAV 
of Croatian UCITS funds decreased from HRK 23,070 billion to HRK 16,028 
billion (HRK 7,042 billion) - the decrease of HRK 6,661 billion refers to the net 
exits of investors from UCITS funds, while the rest of the decrease (HRK 381 
million) refers to the negative market impact. Thus, in Croatia, the COVID-19 
crisis primarily affected UCITS funds. Authors argue that these findings cor-
respond to the primacy of numbers of UCITS funds in the Croatian market in 
comparison to AIFs, and especially in relation to the closed-ended AIFs.
7. CONCLUSION
Closed-ended funds are present in the fund industry, although in lower num-
bers than open-ended, i.e. mutual funds. It seems that redemption right is cru-
cial for the majority of investors when choosing the fund. The most promi-
nent centers for AIFs in Europe, Germany, and Luxembourg, both introduced 
the joint-stock company as the legal form in which closed-ended, and later 
open-ended funds could be established. However, in the German example, the 
InvestmentAG as the AIF in the legal form of the joint-stock company did not 
become popular in practice until it has introduced the redemption right, i.e. 
until it became the open-ended fund.
From the legal perspective, however, the legal form in which the fund is estab-
lished is significant for determining the position of investors, and the corporate 
governance of the fund. Even in cases when the fund is incorporated as a joint-
stock company, it is questionable whether we can completely line up investors 
with shareholders. Both German Investment-AG and Luxembourg SICAV sig-
nificantly deviate from the traditional legal form of the joint-stock companies. 
Thus, in the authors’ opinion, corporate governance of investment funds and 
the position of its investors should be regarded as a new form of corporate 
governance which only partially overlaps with the challenges in traditional 
joint-stock companies.
Croatian perspective shows that Croatian legislative framework from the very 
beginning made the wrong distinction between open-ended and closed-ended 
funds, allowing only legal entities (first joint-stock company, and then lim-
ited liability company) to be founded as closed-ended funds, i.e. looking at 
their form and not the essence (whether investors can ask for the redemption 
of their units at any time or is that right (significantly) limited (and how)). 
This continued until 2018, since when it is possible to establish closed AIFs 
without legal personality, and in October 2020 one such AIF was founded 
125 See HANFA, [https://www.hanfa.hr/],accessed on 9/11/2020.
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(private equity fund). From the investors’ perspective, they have greater rights 
and opportunities to influence fund operations and its fate (investment strat-
egy, risks, duration, mergers, fund, etc.) if a fund is formed in the legal form 
of the joint-stock company, because of the various rights company law gives 
them (via shareholders meetings, supervisory board, etc.), as well as specific 
rights all investors have via investment funds legislation. Investors in Croatian 
open-ended funds have no such rights, all they can do if they don’t like the way 
the fund is managed is leave. 
However, there are only four AIFs established as a joint-stock company in 
Croatia, which clearly states that the current legislative framework for these 
funds is unattractive. In the authors’ opinion, the Croatian legislature should 
de lege ferenda introduce new legal forms for AIFs, such as limited partner-
ships which are considered one of the most popular legal forms for investment 
business in comparative jurisdiction. Also, authors call for a revision of the 
provisions regulating the joint-stock company for AIFs in Croatia, especially 
regarding the relationship between the management of the AIF and the ex-
ternal managers and the possibility to introduce a joint-stock company with 
variable capital, where German Investment-AG and Luxembourg SICAV can 
serve as a role model.
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